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COST OF ADMISSION: ONE RUBBER STAMP – EVALUATING THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTIGATIVE NECESSITY IN WIRETAP
AUTHORIZATIONS AFTER R. V. ARAUJO
Jim Cruess*

Introduction
Between 2000 and 2011, Canadian courts denied 4 of 1358 wiretap1 requests.2
Such near universal authorization of wiretap requests suggests something is wrong.
The application of sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code,3 two provisions
that govern the authorization and renewal of audio wiretaps,4 should reflect both a
practical and a policy-based purpose. From a practical perspective, the application
of “investigative necessity”—a statutory requirement that the requesting government body demonstrate that other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed
in order to authorize most wiretaps5—should distinguish wiretap requests from
much less privacy-invasive warranted searches of property. From a policy perspective, sections 185–186, in part through the application of investigative necessity,
should properly balance the privacy interests of Canadian residents with the
Crown’s interest in the effective investigation and prosecution of crime. As presently drafted and applied, sections 185–186 are failing to reflect both of these
purposes.
* Jim Cruess completed his J.D. at the University of British Columbia. He also holds a B.A. from McGill
University. He would like to thank the editors and faculty reviewer for their helpful comments. All
views expressed are those of the author alone.
1

For the purposes of this article, the term wiretap will be used to describe all forms of prospective interception of communications, including some which do not require proof of investigative necessity such
as video surveillance authorized under a general warrant pursuant to s 487.01 of the Criminal Code, RSC
1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].
2
Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance 2005 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2006) [2005
Report]; Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance 2010 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011)
at 7 [2010 Report]; Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance 2011 (Ottawa: Public Safety
Canada, 2012) at 5 [2011 Report].
3
Criminal Code, supra note 1.
4
Audio wiretaps are the most common means by which police forces are authorized to intercept private
communications. The only other common form of intercept requested is video under a general warrant
by operation of s 487.01 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1.
5
This is not technically the only means by which a requesting State party can prove investigative necessity under s 186 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1. However, in practice, it is the determinative factor:
see Part I.
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For decades, wiretaps have been instrumental in the investigation and prosecution of all manner of criminals including murderers6 and members of complex
criminal networks such as drug trafficking rings.7 Intercepted communications
between alleged offenders provide highly reliable information that can, among other things, identify members of criminal organizations, implicate targets in criminal
activity, and support the conviction of criminals.
While this technology can be an effective investigative tool, it can also facilitate
unnecessary large-scale breaches of the privacy of targeted individuals and their
associates, friends, and families. Wiretaps are indiscriminate in the communications they record. A wiretap will intercept and record an innocent conversation
with a loved one just as it will record the discussion of a large-scale drug transfer.
This indiscriminate privacy infringement is why the Criminal Code must carefully
circumscribe government use of wiretaps. Without effectively enforced limits and
preconditions for the use of wiretaps, privacy will be eroded into a meaningless
value. Justice La Forest, for the majority in R v Duarte, aptly summarized this risk:
[T]he very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left unregulated to annihilate any expectation that our
communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at the
whim of the State to the risk of having a permanent electronic recording
made of our words every time we opened our mouths might be superbly
equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which privacy no longer
had any meaning.8

The Criminal Code primarily protects privacy from unnecessary wiretap surveillance by requiring the requesting body to satisfy a member of the judiciary that
the following criteria are met before receiving authorization for most wiretaps:9
(i) there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence10 has been or is
being committed;11 (ii) the authorization sought will afford evidence of that offence;12 and (iii) investigative necessity is established.13 In essence, the
establishment of investigative necessity is the mechanism that justifies a wiretap’s
increased infringement of a target’s (and his or her associates’) privacy interests
relative to a search of property in favour of the Crown's interest in the effective
investigation of crime.
Authorizing and reviewing judges are best positioned to maintain the right balance between privacy and investigative interests. It follows that in order to strike an
appropriate balance, not only must a judge authorize proposed wiretaps, but he or
See for example: R v Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851.
See for example: R v Mahal, 2012 ONCA 673 [Mahal].
8
R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30 at para 22 [Duarte].
9
Some types of wiretap such as consent wiretaps (Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 184.2), in which one
party to the private communication consents to the interception, do not require proof of investigative
necessity. The privacy implications of consent wiretaps are less problematic, as the consenting party
essentially waives his or her privacy under those circumstances.
10
The term ‘offence’ refers only to those offences listed in s 183 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1.
11
Duarte, supra note 8 interpreting the Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 186(1)(a) which requires that the
authorization “would be in the best interests of the administration of justice.”
12
Ibid.
13
Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 186(1)(b).
6
7
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she must be willing to reject authorization requests due to the failure to show investigative necessity in the name of privacy over investigative interests in some
circumstances.
The additional investigative necessity requirement for authorization of wiretaps
is both logical and necessary when the effects of wiretaps are considered against
those of normal searches of property. First, as noted, unlike normal search warrants which seize evidence in one location at one point in time, wiretaps record all
incoming and outgoing information “like a huge vacuum cleaner, indiscriminately
sucking in the relevant with the irrelevant without distinction”14 for between 60
and over 240 days.15 To put the effect on privacy in perspective, in one recent case,
police intercepted 14,000 communications, of which 83 were deemed relevant and
16 were sought to be admitted as evidence at trial.16 This massive acquisition of
information also violates the privacy of innocent third parties who associate with
the target(s) of wiretaps. Second, unlike normal search warrants, wiretaps depend
on the absence of notice of the information acquisition to the target in order to
succeed. The intercept target is not informed of the wiretap until after its completion.17
Like search warrant authorizations, wiretap authorization hearings are performed ex parte. No party represents the interests of the target(s). The authorizing
judge must make a decision based only on a police affidavit and questions put to
the affiant. This creates a substantial risk of unfairness or abuse.18 It follows that in
order to mitigate that risk, the investigative necessity requirement must both be
legislatively applicable to a given wiretap request and effectively applied by the judiciary in order to balance privacy and investigative interests.
Prior to 2000, investigative necessity was not applied robustly. Wiretap requests
were nearly universally authorized.19 In 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada in
R v Araujo sought to revitalize investigative necessity and strike a fair balance between privacy and investigative interests. The Court found that investigative
necessity is not met solely because a wiretap is most efficacious,20 but a wiretap
does not need to be a tactic of last resort.21 Justice LeBel, speaking on behalf of a
unanimous Court, held that “[t]he judge should not view himself or herself as a
mere rubber stamp”; rather, he or she should take a close look at the material submitted by the applicant to determine if there is “practically speaking, no other
reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances of the particular criminal inquiry.”22
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Electronic Surveillance (Ottawa: Working Paper 47, 1986) at 34.
2010 Report, supra note 2 at 7.
16
R v Spackman (2008), 234 CCC (3d) 24 (Ont SCJ) at para 2.
17
In some cases, such as organized crime wiretap authorizations for investigations of offences under
ss 467.11, 467.12, and 467.13 of the Criminal Code, notice may be delayed even further after the end of
monitoring: see Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 196(5).
18
R v Bogiatzis (2003), 108 CRR (2d) 294 at paras 10-15 (Ont SCJ).
19
See for discussion: Francois Valeriote, “Judicial Authorization for Wiretap: An Illusory Protection”
(1980) 12 Ottawa L Rev 215 at 216.
20
R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 at para 39 [Araujo].
21
Ibid at paras 34-35. Also affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Schreinert (2002), 165 CCC
(3d) 295 at 305 (Ont CA) [Schreinert].
22
Araujo, supra note 20 at para 29.
14
15
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This article seeks to determine whether Araujo, as applied by the courts over
the last thirteen years, did in fact strike a fair balance between Canada’s investigative interests and the privacy interests of its residents in sections 185-186 wiretap
authorizations and reviews.23 Does it impose a sufficiently high standard to authorize privacy-invasive wiretaps relative to traditional searches? On my evaluation, it
does neither. Thus, one must also ask: how can its role be reformed to better balance Canadian citizens’ privacy with the State’s interest in the effective
investigation of crimes?
The article will proceed in four parts. In Part I, it will briefly define investigative
necessity as it has been interpreted by Canadian case law, noting similarities to
wiretap law in the United States and United Kingdom. In Part II, it will examine
how investigative necessity has been legislated out of significance in the investigation of some crimes under the Criminal Code. Specifically, it looks at legislated
exceptions in which investigative necessity need not be proven and the ramifications of those exceptions. In Part III, it will examine the application of Araujo
based on wiretap authorization statistics and wiretap review jurisprudence since
2000. This analysis will show that investigative necessity as currently applied has
little to no effect on the authorization or denial of wiretap requests and their admission as evidence at trial. I assert that courts are unnecessarily favouring the
State’s interest in criminal investigation and prosecution over the privacy of Canadian residents by failing to apply the investigative necessity requirement in the way
the Supreme Court intended in Araujo. Finally, Part IV will conclude and propose
some preliminary reforms. I suggest that in order to properly balance privacy and
investigative interests, changes need only ensure that (i) investigative necessity is
always applied for wiretap authorizations, and (ii) investigative necessity is applied
in a manner that ensures authorization requests are rejected on the failure to
demonstrate it. These proposed reforms seek to ensure that the application of investigative necessity protects the privacy of Canadians from unnecessary
surveillance and serves as more than a “rubber stamp” requirement.
I. The Meaning of Investigative Necessity
Investigative necessity can be met by any one of three disjunctive grounds listed
in subsection 186(1)(b) of the Code, namely that:
(i) Other investigative procedures have been tried and failed;
(ii) Other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed; or
(iii) The urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry
out the investigation of the offence using only other investigative procedures.24
One commentator argued that the Court did not go far enough in Araujo. He argues that despite its
apparently strong language, Araujo represents only an aspirational statement of the law with no real
effect on wiretap authorizations or admission of wiretaps into evidence at trial: Nathan Forester, “Electronic Surveillance, Criminal Investigations, and the Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Canada:
Regressive U-Turn or a Mere Bump in the Road Towards Charter Justice” (2010) 73 Sask L Rev 23 at 66.
24
R v Smyk (1993), 86 CCC (3d) 63 at 70 (Man CA).
23

!
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In practice, only one ground is regularly contended: that other investigative
procedures are unlikely to succeed. Police need not prove the first ground—that all
other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed—because the Supreme Court
in Araujo held that investigative necessity is not a test of last resort.25 The third
ground, urgency, is rarely argued because historically police could obtain an emergency wiretap under section 188 without proving investigative necessity if the
situation truly needed expeditious investigation.26 Thus, the determination of
whether no other reasonable alternative methods of investigation exist will usually
hinge on whether methods that were not tried were unlikely to succeed.
In determining whether other reasonable methods of investigation exist, the authorizing judge must evaluate the request based on the objective of the
investigation.27 For example, while planting an undercover officer close to a suspected drug trafficker may gather evidence against that trafficker, it may not be a
reasonable investigative tactic to identify the leaders of the trafficking ring and acquire evidence of their guilt.28
The authorizing judge must also consider the risks and realities associated with
other means of investigation.29 Thus, the investigation of some crimes, such as drug
trafficking, may preclude otherwise reasonable practices, such as the use of an undercover officer or police agent, because trafficking groups can be expected to
employ counter-intelligence and violence to avoid police detection.30
Finally, investigative necessity must be considered with regard to the investigation as a whole, rather than evaluated as it concerns each named person in the
authorization request.31 Thus, an accused cannot successfully argue that the police
should have executed a search warrant on his or her house, rather than seek a wiretap, if the search would not lead to evidence against other members of the drugtrafficking ring.32
The Canadian investigative necessity requirement is similar in form to the requirement in force in the United Kingdom, which says that the Secretary of State33
must consider “whether the information which is thought necessary to obtain under the warrant could reasonably be obtained by other means.34
In the United States, the necessity required to authorize wiretaps is also similarly worded, requiring that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have
Araujo, supra note 20 at para 29.
This provision was struck down in 2012 by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Tse, 2012 SCC 16.
The Court held that s 184.4 of the Criminal Code violated the s 8 Charter right against unreasonable
search or seizure because it did not provide a mechanism for oversight or notice to the person whose
communications were intercepted. The breach could not be saved by s 1. However, the Court made
clear that an emergency wiretap provision could be valid under s 8 in exigent circumstances. Thus, in
future, police will likely retain a similar power when a new emergency wiretap provision is legislated
27
Araujo, supra note 20 at para 43; R v Paris (2006), 208 OAC 385 at para 17 (CA) [Paris].
28
See for example R v Adam, 2006 BCSC 382 at paras 137-140 [Adam].
29
R v Wasfi, 2006 BCCA 55 at para 49 [Wasfi].
30
Ibid.
31
R v Pham, 2002 BCCA 247 at para 85 [Pham] citing R v Tahirkheli (1998), 130 CCC (3d) 19 at 22 (Ont
CA); Mahal, supra note 7.
32
Pham, supra note 32 at para 43.
33
In the UK, the Secretary of State and his or her delegated agents are responsible for wiretap authorizations, rather than a judge.
34
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), 2000, c 23, s 5(4).
25
26
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failed, reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or are too dangerous.35
However, in the United States, the requesting body must establish necessity in order to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment protecting against
unreasonable searches and seizures.36
Section 8 of the Charter,37 unlike the United States’ Fourth Amendment, does
not mandate proof of investigative necessity in order to authorize wiretaps.38 This
fact is reflected in the diminished significance of investigative necessity in the Canadian Criminal Code since sections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) entered into force.
II. Diminished Significance of Investigate Necessity in the Criminal Code
Investigative necessity no longer must be proven to authorize all section 186
wiretaps. Sections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) now state that investigative necessity need
not be proven to authorize a wiretap for the investigation of (i) terrorism offences,
(ii) offences committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a
criminal organization, or (iii) offences under sections 467.11-467.13 of the Code.
Trial and appellate courts across Canada have held these exceptions to be constitutionally valid.39 The practical effect of these exceptions on wiretap authorizations is
significant. In essence, they have relegated investigative necessity to insignificance
in many of the cases in which wiretaps are traditionally sought.40
Parliament legislated that investigative necessity need not be proven for offences associated with criminal organizations in 1997.41 The criminal organization
provisions took their current form by amendment in 2001 42 due to a concern that
the 1997 definition of ‘criminal organization’ was too narrow and thus easily
avoided by criminals.43 The result was a broader definition that allows police to
more easily wiretap organized groups of suspected criminals. The terrorism exception was also added in 2001.44 Both the first criminal organization and the antiterrorism amending statutes note in their preambles that the challenges of combating and deterring these activities require an enhanced capacity to investigate them.
Each also came on the heels of a significant criminal event that caused public out-

Title III, 18 USC s 2518(3)(c).
Confirmed by LeBel J. in Araujo, supra note 20 at para 32. Also see DF Cook, “Electronic Surveillance,
Title III, and the Requirement of Necessity,” (1973) 2 Hast CLQ 571.
37
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
38
R v Largie, 2010 ONCA 548 [Largie]; R v SAB, [2003] 2 SCR 678.
39
R v Doiron, 2007 NBCA 41 at paras 43-46, leave to appeal to SCC refused [2007] SCCA No 413; R v
Lucas, 2009 CanLII 27835 (Ont SCJ); R v NY, 2008 CanLII 15908 (Ont SCJ); R v Pangman, [2000] 8
WWR 536 at 551-561 (Man QB).
40
A substantial amount (from 2006-2010, approx. 20% conservatively) wiretap authorizations arise in
terrorism or organized crime cases with multiple perpetrators. See below for discussion.
41
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal organizations) and to amend other Acts in consequence,
SC 1997, c 23, s 6.
42
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law enforcement) and to make consequential
amendments to other Acts, SC 2001, c 32, s 6.
43
R v Terezakis, 2007 BCCA 384 at para 9 [Terezakis].
44
Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41, s 6.1.
35
36
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cry45 and ‘moral panic’.46 First was the fear of organized crime in the wake of a gang
war; next was the fear of terrorism after 9/11. These moral panics resulted in a legislative ratcheting effect, such that the barriers to authorizing a wiretap were
incrementally removed in response to a collective moment of fear. The moral panic
eventually subsided, but the changes remained. As a result, wiretaps are authorized
in the same way as a traditional search for anyone about whom there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe he or she is committing one of the types of
offences listed in sections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1). When a wiretap can be authorized
on the same grounds as a search of property, why would the police tip their hand to
the target with a traditional search and its notice requirements? The same grounds
can allow for greater information acquisition (with concomitant greater privacy
infringement). Nowhere is this exception of more concern than in the investigation
of offences committed in violation of sections 467.11, 467.12, and 467.13 of the
Criminal Code.47
The provisions of sections 467.11-467.13 create a hierarchy of offences associated with criminal organizations.48 Participating in or contributing to any activity of
a criminal organization for the purpose of enhancing its ability to commit crimes
(section 467.11) bears the lowest stigma; committing an indictable offence for the
benefit of such an organization (section 467.12) is more serious; and instructing a
person to commit an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization (section
467.13) is the most serious. The effect of the legislative immunity from proving
investigative necessity with regard to these offences is strongest with regard to section 467.11.
Under section 467.1 of the Criminal Code, a criminal organization must (i) be
composed of three or more people in or outside Canada, (ii) have as one of its main
purposes or main activities, the facilitation or commission of one or more serious
offences49, and (iii) likely gain a material benefit from the commission of such serious offence(s), or such a benefit is gained by at least one of its members.50 The

45

The organized crime legislation was passed on the eve of a federal election around which time the
Quebec Attorney General issued a plea for new measures to address a violent and protracted fight between the Hell’s Angels and Rock Machine in Quebec, which had recently resulted in the death of an
innocent young boy on a public street from a bomb blast (D Stuart, “Politically Expedient But Potentially Unjust Criminal Legislation against Gants,” Alan D Gold Collection of Criminal Law Articles,
ADGN/RP-056 (1997) (Law Society of Upper Canada Session on Criminal Law and the Charter, September 27, 1997), and Colloquium on Organized Crime, International Association of Penal Law in
Egypt, November 1997 at paras 3-7). The other came months after September 11, 2001, a date on which
al-Qaeda operatives launched four coordinated terror attacks against the United States.
46
A moral panic is a time in which “[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and
solutions; ways of coping are evolved (or more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.” Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The
Creation of the Mods and the Rockers (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972) at 9.
47
Criminal Code, supra note 1.
48
Terezakis, supra note 44 at para 11 citing Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 467.1.
49
A serious offence is defined as an indictable offence with a maximum punishment of five or more
years in prison.
50
Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 467.1.
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criminal organization cannot form randomly.51 The Supreme Court of Canada in
R v Venneri determined that a flexible approach to this definition is appropriate,
but made clear that the term “organized,” connoting some degree of structure and
coordination, limits the scope of groups to which the definition can be applied.52
The problem with this definition of criminal organization with regard to wiretap authorizations is its breadth. Practically, for police to dodge the obligation to
prove investigative necessity, they need only show that the target is “associated”
with a criminal organization. Some offences such as drug trafficking are regularly
perpetrated by an organized group of at least three people in which at least one
member stands to benefit. A close association with such a group may show reasonable and probable grounds that a person contributes to that organization for the
purpose of enhancing its ability to commit crime. Thus, an innocent party’s mere
association with this kind of group may open him or her up to the large-scale acquisition of personal information by the State based only on the elements of a
normal search warrant.53 The breadth of individuals to whom section 467.11 opens
wiretap investigation seriously decreases the privacy protection provided by investigative necessity to criminally innocent parties from surveillance or to people who
would otherwise only be subject to a less invasive search of property.
A Member of Parliament argued this erosion of privacy was necessary in order
to “relieve police officers of a paper burden.”54 That Member supported making the
change “because when investigating organized crime, it is almost always obvious
that [wiretapping] is a last resort.”55 Thus, investigative necessity, which was intended to protect residents from the power of the State to surreptitiously intrude
upon and record their lives, was eliminated for many residents in order to save the
police the time and effort it takes to show wiretapping is really necessary.
The efficacy of this avenue to authorize wiretaps was not lost on the police. Between 2006 and 2010, from a total of 553 wiretap requests, the police made 97
requests to wiretap target(s) contributing to a criminal organization, 90 for commission of an offence in relation to a criminal organization and 44 for instructing
the commission of an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization.56 In combination with the (at least) 22 authorizations granted for terrorism-related
offences,57 it is clear that the privacy protection provided by investigative necessity
has been significantly diminished, thus exposing residents to an increased risk of
large-scale privacy violations in the name of State criminal investigation. This finding represents the first indicator that investigative necessity does not play a
significant role in Canadian wiretap law. The application of investigative necessity
(in cases where it still applies) is the second, and much more concerning, indicator
Ibid.
R v Venneri, 2012 SCC 33 at paras 28-31, 35.
53
Even s 467.12 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1, which bears a higher stigma than s 467.11, does not
require membership in the criminal organization to meet the actus reus of the offence: Venneri, supra
note 53 at para 51.
54
House of Commons Debates, 35th Parl, 2nd Sess, (21 April 1997) at 9976 [House Debates].
55
Ibid [emphasis added].
56
2010 Report, supra note 2 at 11. It should be cautioned that most surveillance authorizations are
granted in relation to more than one offence, so there was likely overlap in the number of individual
wiretaps authorized under this statutory exception.
57
Ibid at 8-9.
51
52
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that investigative necessity no longer has a significant role and thus is not effectively balancing investigative and privacy interests.
III. The Legacy of Araujo: Investigative Necessity as Applied by the Courts
Investigative necessity is applied by the courts in two different contexts. First, it
is applied during the initial ex parte hearing to determine if a wiretap will be authorized or renewed. Second, it can be applied by a reviewing judge in a voir dire to
determine the admissibility of wiretap evidence. At both of these levels, statistics
and jurisprudence show that investigative necessity plays a very small role in limiting the authorization of wiretaps or the use of wiretap evidence at trial.
A.

Initial Wiretap Authorizations

Statistics from the ten years following Araujo are so stark that they suggest judicial rubber-stamping of wiretap requests remains the norm. From 2001 to 2005,
two of 689 wiretap authorization or renewal requests were denied.58 Between 2006
and 2010, two of 553 requests were denied.59 In 2011, zero of 116 were denied.60
Skeptics would argue that these chilling statistics are justifiable because wiretaps improve the ability of the State to both investigate and prosecute crime.
However, the figures show that prosecution of cases involving wiretaps is far from
a successful endeavour despite courts’ almost universal admission of wiretap evidence.61 While the 551 successful wiretap requests between 2006 and 2010 resulted
in the arrest of 2617 people whose identities became known as a result of the wiretap,62 only 453 (17.3%) were convicted.63 Proceedings were pursued against at least
2126 of those individuals.64 From that conservative estimate of the total individuals
against whom proceedings were commenced, only 21.3% were convicted. Of particular concern is the fact that in 2009 and 2010, only 22 of 502 people arrested
(4.4%) were successfully convicted.65 In 2011, 294 people whose identity became
known from an interception were arrested.66 Proceedings were pursued against at
2005 Report, supra note 2. Of those 689, 70 were for s 467.11, 46 for 467.12, and 41 for 467.13, all of
which do not require proof of investigative necessity. Another 91 were for either video or emergency
audio wiretaps, neither of which requires the affiant to establish investigative necessity.
59
2010 Report, supra note 2 at 5-6. One hundred twenty-seven of the requests in this range were for
either video or emergency audio wiretaps.
60
2011 Report, supra note 2. Thirty-five of this total were for video surveillance.
61
See Part III.B for detailed discussion.
62
2010 Report, supra note 2 at 13.
63
Ibid at 16.
64
2010 Report, supra note 2 at 14-15. The term ‘at least’ is used due to the nature of the data available.
The reports divide the persons against whom proceedings were commenced between those persons who
were identified and not identified in the authorization. Within each of those two categories, the reports
divide between people charged with (i) an offence specified in the authorization; (ii) and offence for
which an authorization may be given, but was not specified in the authorization; and (iii) an offence for
which no authorization may be given. The total of 2126 individuals is the sum of only those people
charged with an offence specified in the authorization. In other words, that number assumes that all
people charged with an offence in category (ii) or (iii) were also charged with an offence specified in the
authorization. It is the most conservative figure at which one could arrive.
65
Ibid.
66
2011 Report, supra note 2 at 13.
58
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least 234.67 Zero had been convicted by the time Public Safety Canada released its
2011 Annual Report.68 These figures are nearly 50% below the Public Prosecution
Service of Canada’s 2008 conviction rate of 69.4%.69
While alarming, these numbers cannot simply be taken at face value. The discrepancy could at least in part be explained by the fact that wiretaps are often used
on complex cases which are more difficult to prove in court. However, an over 50%
gap certainly suggests that the benefit wiretaps provide through crime investigation, prevention and prosecution is at least more limited than one would assume,
thus diminishing the utility of the large-scale invasion of privacy.
The statistics above suggest that the courts may not be applying investigative
necessity robustly during first instance ex parte wiretap authorizations. In fact, the
statistics suggest the possibility that the entire wiretap authorization process may
be an illusory protection of privacy interests. In addition, the benefit police and
prosecutors gain from the use of wiretaps is significantly smaller than one would
assume.
This insignificance of investigative necessity is mirrored in the review of authorizations by trial judges. In fact, other rules concerning the review of wiretaps
and admission of evidence obtained in breach of the Charter actually further diminish the significance of investigative necessity, even when courts suspect or exexplicitly find that it has not been proven. The result is that investigative necessity
is a nearly meaningless protection after the initial wiretap authorization is granted.
B.

Review of Authorizations at Trial

On review, investigative necessity has proven to be at least as insignificant as it
is in initial authorizations. Out of approximately 75 cases decided after Araujo that
were reviewed, four final decisions found a failure to meet investigative necessity.70
Of those four, illegally obtained wiretap evidence was admitted in two because of
the subsequent Charter subsection 24(2) analysis under Grant71 and Collins.72 Only
one reported case resulted in the exclusion of evidence.73 These statistics alone suggest that investigative necessity is not serving its role protecting Canadians’ privacy
from unnecessary wiretap surveillance.

Ibid at 14-15.
Ibid at 16-17. 2011 figures should be viewed cautiously as many trials may not have concluded by the
time of writing.
69
Hong Kong, Legislative Council Secretariat, Conviction Rates in Selected Places at 2, online:
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/sec/library/0910in19-e.pdf>. The PPSC’s conviction rate is
not a perfect comparison to the wiretap conviction rate since crimes under the jurisdiction of provincial
Attorneys General may involve wiretaps. It is, however, an acceptable approximation due to the use of
wiretaps predominantly in drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime cases, all of which are under
federal jurisdiction.
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B1. Legal Barriers
The parameters under which a trial judge must operate when reviewing a wiretap authorization all but ensure wiretap evidence will be admitted. First, the trial
judge has the discretion to allow the Crown to amplify the police affidavit by presenting evidence in order to buttress a defective warrant.74 This practice was
expressly maintained, though limited, by Araujo. The Court in Araujo cautioned
that “amplification cannot go so far as to remove the requirement that the police
make their case to the issuing judge, thereby turning the authorization procedure
into a sham.”75 Though Araujo greatly restricted the Crown’s ability to amplify the
basis for a search warrant and cautioned the courts to be careful not to allow amplification to subvert the requirement for prior authorization,76 the sheer
maintenance of amplification to some extent lets the Crown, in those circumstances where it applies, “attempt to explain away the illegality of the actions of the
police by way of amplification.”77 It is another mechanism which diminishes the
significance of a failure to show investigative necessity in an initial request hearing.
Second, the trial judge is prohibited from conducting a de novo review of the
authorizing judge’s decision. R v Garofoli established that the reviewing judge may
only find that a statutory requirement was not met if the authorizing judge “could
not have granted the authorization” based on the record before them as amplified.78
Thus, in addition to modifying the initial record through amplification, the trial
judge must give deference to the authorizing judge’s decision from a hearing in
which only one side was represented.79 This standard of review only further decreases the likelihood that a reviewing court will determine investigative necessity
was not met, much less exclude evidence.
Finally, as noted, if the trial judge finds that investigative necessity was not met,
he or she still must undergo a subsection 24(2) Charter analysis to determine if the
evidence should actually be excluded. It is by no means guaranteed that the evidence will be excluded either, as only one case of those surveyed actually resulted in
the exclusion of wiretap evidence.80
Each of the above successive barriers makes it increasingly less likely that improperly obtained wiretap evidence will be excluded at trial. These barriers ensure
that investigative necessity carries very little practical significance to exclude wiretap evidence at the review stage of analysis even if it was not established at the
initial wiretap request hearing. However, the jurisprudence also shows a deeper
74

Glen Luther, “Of Excision, Amplification and Standing: Making Sense of the Law of Evidence in the
Context of Challenges to Warranted Searches” (2006) 11 Can Crim L Rev 1 at 2. Defence may also amplify the affidavit before the trial judge, but this is a normal practice, as the trial is usually the first time
at which the defence can argue against the sufficiency of information to authorize a wiretap authorization. In addition, unconstitutionally or erroneously obtained information may be excised from the
record based on the accused’s amplification of the record. These errors, too, do not vitiate the authorization. Paris, supra note 27 at para 8.
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Araujo, supra note 20 at para 59.
76
Luther, supra note 74 at 3.
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Ibid at 4-5.
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R v Garofoli, [1990] 2 SCR 1421 at 1452 [emphasis added].
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See for example R v Blizzard, 2003 NBQB 420 at para 13; R v Valentine, 2009 CarswellOnt 8868 at
paras 28-29 (SCJ); R v Chan, 2001 BCSC 831 at para 43.
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concern. A practice of deference to the police has developed which results in findings that investigative necessity is met essentially on the word of the requesting
officer(s) or their agent both at ex parte hearings and on review.
B2. Application of Investigative Necessity in Reasons
Deference to the police has primarily manifested itself in wiretap case law in
two ways.81 Both have the capability to mislead judges to believe that there are no
reasonable alternative methods of investigation remaining when other reasonable
methods exist.
First, in most cases, broad investigative objectives allowed the police to successfully argue wiretaps were the only reasonable method of investigation available.
Generally, so long as there were reasonable and probable grounds the targeted individual(s) were involved in the alleged offence(s) with other people, investigative
necessity was found to be met.82 For example, a defence argument that police
should have inserted an undercover officer before seeking a wiretap was rejected in
multiple cases because the undercover officer could not discover the full range of
associates in a drug trafficking ring that would be found with a wiretap.83 Even
when a police officer had been highly successful in infiltrating a drug ring as an
undercover agent, the breadth of the objective to uncover other parties involved in
the ring was sufficient to meet investigative necessity.84
This kind of deference has led to acceptance of requesting affidavits that on
their face do not meet the plain meaning of investigative necessity. In R v Ahmed,
the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a decision that investigative necessity
was met in a case where an undercover operation was proceeding well.85 The affidavit filed in support of the authorization request stated:
Notwithstanding that the undercover operation component of this investigation is proceeding favourably at this time, I believe there is a
requirement for a full Authorization to intercept private communications because a crucial component of the undercover operation is the
relationship the undercover operator has with the targets of the investigation. I believe the targets will usually speak to associates about their
relationship with the undercover operators, often times making comments which clearly demonstrate how the targets view the undercover
operators. This information is extremely valuable to personnel planning
and directing the undercover operation as it allows them to accurately
81

In order to determine trends in the case law, approximately 75 cases from across Canada were surveyed.
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In fact, one of the only cases in which a broad objective was rejected is Spackman. That case concerned a single murder involving two accused. The Crown theory that the investigation concerning
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assess the state of mind of the target, to plan future scenarios to address
the credibility concerns and also to get advance warning if there are
concerns for the safety of the undercover operator. Furthermore, it provides the best evidence at trial should the accused put forth a defence he
was aware the undercover operators were police officers.86

The affidavit essentially argues that a wiretap is requested to support an already
successful, ongoing undercover operation. Rather than demonstrate there is no
other reasonable alternative tactic, the RCMP showed exactly how another tactic
was succeeding, and requested a wiretap in support of it. The Court of Appeal held
that investigative necessity was met because other procedures alone were unlikely
to provide the full extent of activities of the target and his associates.87
The case law shows that a broad investigative objective can effectively eliminate
the viability of any investigative tactic other than a wiretap in the eyes of the courts.
By pleading that such an objective is the purpose of a wiretap, the requesting organization will likely not have to meaningfully justify the need for a wiretap when
other aspects of an investigation are proceeding well.
Second, even if a broad objective does not eliminate all other alternative methods of investigation, judges have demonstrated a willingness to defer to the opinion
of the requesting police officer if it is at all supported by a reason. The Ontario
Court of Appeal in R v Paris endorsed this statement from an Ontario High Court
judgment:
I think that on such an application the judge would be entitled, if he or
she saw fit to do so, to place considerable weight on the police officer’s
opinions as to the probable success of various types of possible investigative procedures in different types of cases. I hazard the view that police
officers probably know more about such matters than most judges.88

Acceptance of a police officer’s opinion is certainly not always improper. The problem is not with a properly weighed decision to rely on a police officer’s evaluation
of whether an investigative tactic would be effective, but rather how often the
courts have seen fit to place significant weight on an officer’s stated opinion. The
risk that judges will have their role as the trier of fact usurped to some degree is no
different from the risk associated with expert evidence.89 A trier of fact is more likely to accept an expert’s opinion than inquire into a technical area about which they
know little. That is why the admission of expert evidence is limited in other areas of
law. The police are experts in the investigation of crime. The risk of the expert
usurping the trier’s role is equally real in wiretap law as it is in any other areas in
which an expert testifies. Reliance on police opinion risks shifting the analysis from
the reasonableness of alternative methods of investigation to the believability of
police reasons, a standard that is much easier for the requesting body to meet.
Ibid at para 18 [emphasis added].
Ibid at para 32.
88
Paris, supra note 27 at para 22 citing R v Ho, [1987] OJ No 925 at 8 (HC) [emphasis added]; also see R
v Dixon, 2012 ONSC 181 at para 68.
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This concern is brought to life by the case law. In R v Pham,90 the trial judge accepted a police officer’s assertion that surveillance of non-public parts of an airport
was not a reasonable alternative because all airport workers, including those involved in a drug trafficking ring, knew exactly who was supposed to be on shift at
any given time.91 The judge also accepted the assertion that search warrants of
known parties to the offence against whom the police had reasonable and probable
grounds to search would not have yielded information about the leaders of the organization even though one of those leaders’ property could be searched.92
In R v Schreinert, similar faith was placed in police opinion. In Schreinert, the
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a wiretap authorization despite the fact that police
(i) did not attempt to infiltrate a drug ring, (ii) did not attempt to obtain a search
warrant for a suspected drug dealer with whom the accused had dealings, (iii) undertook minimal surveillance of relevant locations, (iv) declined to plant an
undercover agent in the organization because it would take too much time, and (v)
declined to seek cooperation from another police service that could have assisted in
the investigation “for political reasons.”93
The only end to this deference to police opinion came when police either (i)
gave the Court no reason to believe an investigative method would be unlikely to
succeed, (ii) inexplicably chose not to undertake common sense elements of police
investigation or (iii) acted in bad faith. In R v Fraser, the police simply made conclusory statements that there were no police agents in the targeted organization nor
was it likely that either of two informants within the group would be able to introduce an undercover operator.94 Thus, there was nothing the Court could believe to
explain why these were not reasonable alternative methods. In R v Spackman, the
police inexplicably decided not to undertake a search of the accused’s vehicle to
which he consented, and chose not to interview relevant witnesses providing no
reason for the conduct.95 In R v Eatmon and R v Terezakis, a police officer went
even further and actually hid information from either the wiretap requesting officer or the authorizing judge,96 thus clearly demonstrating bad faith. In all of these
cases, there was no factually viable explanation for the reviewing judge to believe.
These were the only four of approximately 75 wiretap review cases surveyed in
which a court did not uphold an initial finding that investigative necessity was met.
In many other cases surveyed, unnecessary deference to police investigative experience effectively lowered the investigative necessity requirement from “no
reasonable alternative forms of investigation” to “no believable reasons provided”97
Pham Ontario, supra note 85.
Ibid at paras 68-69.
92
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97
In this case, a broad investigative objective is another form of reason justifying the choice not to use
an investigative method.
90
91

!

Vol. 22

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

73

for choosing not to undertake an investigation. The application of investigative
necessity in this manner both fails to properly apply the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning in Araujo and unfairly favours the investigation of crimes over
privacy.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations to Reform Investigative Necessity
The above analysis shows that investigative necessity gives no more protection
of privacy now than it did before Araujo. As it was applied, the Supreme Court’s
call to make investigative necessity more than a “rubber stamp” requirement has
failed to have a significant effect.
Investigative necessity need not be proven in a significant percentage of wiretap
cases (≈20% conservatively) due to subsections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code. Even when it is applied, almost no authorization requests are rejected for
failure to meet investigative necessity at first instance. Upon review, there are significant legal barriers to overcome, such as the Garofoli98 standard of review and
the court’s decision whether to exclude evidence under subsection 24(2) of the
Charter, before a court will exclude improperly obtained wiretap evidence. Finally,
the courts have shown a tendency to defer to police opinions when finding that no
reasonable alternative methods of investigation exist.
This series of hurdles has relegated investigative necessity to a position of near
insignificance with regard to the outcome of wiretap authorization requests and
cases. At present, investigative necessity barely distinguishes wiretaps from traditional search authorizations. However, that need not be the case. The issues
causing the weakness of investigative necessity are primarily in the application (or
lack thereof) of the standard rather than the formulation of Criminal Code subsection 186(1)(b) or the test to establish it. Araujo and subsection 186(1)(b) provide
an effective base upon which to determine whether investigative necessity is established. Investigative necessity, if properly applied, can distinguish wiretaps from
traditional searches and better balance privacy and criminal investigative interests.
The following proposals would serve to breathe some life back into investigative
necessity in order that it may serve those two purposes.
A.

Guidelines and Judicial Education

The creation of internal memoranda or bulletins to educate judges on current
police investigative methods would allow the bench to better inquire into the existence of other reasonable alternative methods of investigation. These memoranda
would ideally be created by the courts of each province to maintain independence,
but could alternatively be provided and updated by credible experts whose materials are reviewed or overseen by senior judges with experience in the area. Such
documents should be confidential, so as to ensure they are not used by criminal
organizations to structure operations in ways that evade necessary authorizations
of wiretaps. Information about investigative techniques could also be disseminated
in forums such as judicial education conferences or less formal judicial education
98

Garofoli, supra note 80.
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seminars which are commonplace in Canadian courts. Such education materials
could provide substance to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Araujo by giving
courts more tools to determine if there are no other reasonable alternative methods
of investigation.
As stated in R v Paris, the police know more about investigative methods than
judges.99 However, judges need a sufficient familiarity with police investigative procedure and tactics to properly balance Canadians’ privacy interests with State
investigative interests.100 The proposed memoranda, bulletins and education programs could provide explanations of current police investigative methodologies
through academic work and vetted materials from police or former police experts if
available. As the documents would be kept confidential within the courts, such
information could be disseminated to the bench without concern about compromising investigative efficacy. Confidentiality would thus ensure that the courts are
better equipped to determine the issue, and ensure that such information is not
used to obstruct the police’s investigative duties and objectives.
The creation of internal memoranda, bulletins and education programs is fundamentally important to aid judges hearing initial authorization requests. Given
the ex parte nature of these hearings, triers of fact must be able to inquire into the
investigation at a deeper level than would be necessary in an adversarial hearing.
This kind of administrative solution is superior to other possible solutions like
calls for the Supreme Court of Canada to review the Garofoli standard of review or
the admission of evidence under subsection 24(2) of the Charter.101 Updated written materials and education programs can be crafted and organized immediately.
There is no need for the right facts to arise for the Supreme Court to reconsider
one of its decisions. Issues like the Garofoli standard of review may need to be addressed down the road, but they are issues that will require further consideration to
craft a better solution.
By drafting guidelines and creating education programs, the courts can begin to
re-establish balance between privacy and state investigation today. Such a reform
would help to ensure investigative necessity is effectively applied at first instance in
wiretap request hearings and in reviews at trial or on appeal.
B.

Repeal of subsections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code

My second proposal lacks the ease and immediate effect of the first, but it is
equally important. Investigative necessity is the only thing that distinguishes section 186 wiretap authorizations from traditional searches. Proof of it justifies the
increased infringement of privacy that is inherent to wiretaps relative to traditional
searches of property, which are limited in temporal and geographic scope. It follows that investigative necessity must be proven in all section 186 wiretap

Paris, supra note 27 at para 22 citing R v Ho, [1987] OJ No 925 at 8 (HC).
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101
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authorization hearings.102 In order for that to occur, subsections 185(1.1) and
186(1.1) of the Criminal Code103 must be repealed.
There is no doubt that terrorism and organized crime must be investigated
thoroughly and effectively by Canadian police. However, proving investigative necessity for wiretaps does not meaningfully inhibit that ability. A Member of
Parliament argued to remove the requirement because wiretaps are “almost always” the last resort in this type of crime.104 It is exactly that fact which is why
proof of investigative necessity never should have been removed for wiretap requests related to those offences. Organized crime and terrorism investigations are
the types most likely to meet investigative necessity. Organized criminal and terrorist organizations are often tight-knit groups in which it is hard to plant an
undercover police officer or recruit a police agent; they may employ countersurveillance to overcome more traditional forms of investigation; in short, they are
difficult to investigate.105 Removal of the requirement does not significantly benefit
the State interest in investigation and prosecution of crime beyond easing the time
commitment of preparing part of the wiretap authorization or renewal request
affidavit. Therefore, subsections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) should be repealed in order
to recreate a legal distinction between authorizations for wiretaps and traditional
searches, two investigative tactics which are markedly different in practice.
C.

Summary

These two reforms represent modest changes that would allow investigative necessity to better protect citizens from unnecessary authorization of large-scale
privacy infringement by the State without significantly interfering with the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Each reform targets the evaluation of
investigative necessity at the initial hearing by ensuring that the authorizing judge
has the knowledge, resources and legislative framework available to properly apply
the investigative necessity test established in Araujo. They also avoid the need to
make massive jurisprudential changes to legal principles like the Garofoli standard
of review and exclusion of wiretap evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.
Without these initial changes, investigative necessity will be relegated to the realm
of procedural niceties that lack substantive force. With these changes, the application of investigative necessity will make the judge in a wiretap hearing more than a
“rubber stamp.”
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